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Abstract
This paper explores the implications of monetary policy rules in
the general equilibrium two-country framework of Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(1995). It is argued that the sign of the correlation of domestic and
foreign outputs can be positive after a monetary shock, contrary to
the standard result. The reason is that an interest rate rule targeting
the consumer price index implies less volatile terms of trade and this
reduces the expenditure switching e¤ect, and thus the demand e¤ect
through the fall of the real interest rate prevails. It is also shown that
inertia in the interest rate rule is a necessary condition for the model
to display persistence of the real variables after a shock to the interest
rate rule.
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11 Introduction
The analytical tools for studying the international transmission of mone-
tary shocks were developed in the 1960s by Robert Mundell (1962, 1968)
and Marcus Fleming (1962), and the resulting Mundell-Fleming model has
been the workhorse of both theorists and policy-makers for the last decades.
The two-country version of the model predicts that a monetary expansion in
one country will produce an increase in home output and a negative output
response in the other country. The transmission mechanism is the trade bal-
ance: the home country will lower its interest rate, depreciate the exchange
rate and gain competitiveness, thus producing an expenditure switching ef-
fect from foreign goods to home goods, resulting in an improvement of the
home country trade balance, an increase in its output and a decrease in for-
eign output, the so-called beggar-thy-neighbour e¤ect. On the …nancial side
of the model, perfect capital mobility requires interest rates to equal (in the
version with static expectations), hence foreign interest rate will decrease
and this should make foreign output grow. However, without an increase in
foreign real money balances, the positive slope of the LM curve implies that
a lower interest rate can only be matched with lower output.
The equations of the Mundell-Fleming model were ad-hoc, in the sense
that they were not the result of the optimizing behaviour of agents. In
the mid-80s Keynesian economists began to build a framework in which the
optimizing behaviour of both …rms and consumers could account for the
empirical short-run non-neutrality of money. Imperfect competition is the
framework that allows the …rms to …x prices and to introduce some reason
for these prices not to be changed in the face of small variations in demand.
This reason is the cost of adjustment of prices or “menu costs”. The resulting
model is sometimes referred to as the “New Neoclassical Synthesis”, as in
Goodfriend and King (1997).
In the …eld of international macroeconomics, this setup was not imple-
mented until recently, with the seminal Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) model
(hereafter OR). The OR or redux model is a simple two country environment,
lacking some fundamental features such as stochastic shocks, investment and
capital accumulation, price dynamics, etc. The purpose of the model was
to show that nominal shocks can have real e¤ects in both countries in the
short run and even in the long run in an optimizing general equilibrium
model, provided some nominal price rigidity is in place. Some of their re-
sults were surprising: monetary shocks can have long lasting real e¤ects on
both countries due to the wealth reallocation that produces the short run
current account imbalance. Another important feature of this framework
is that it is suitable for welfare analysis. The traditional Keynesian model
2stressed the beggar-thy-neighbour result of a monetary expansion that leads
to a depreciation and to an expenditure switching e¤ect. However, Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ proved that in their model this e¤ect is only of second order on
utility on both countries, while there is a …rst order positive e¤ect due to the
increase in aggregate world demand and output, resulting in an equal welfare
improvement for both countries.
These features have been so fruitful that a large literature has devel-
oped under the title of New Open Economy Macroeconomics.1 In this strand
progress has been made during the last few years in a number of direc-
tions: some extensions have explored the relevance of critical parameters,
the stochastic environment has been analytically fully-‡edged (Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ 1998 and 2000), the model has been adapted to the pricing to mar-
ket (PTM) behaviour of …rms and staggered price setting has been intro-
duced, along with capital accumulation to provide a complete business cycle
model. Lane (1999) provides a comprehensive survey. One of the remaining
challenges is to build dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with
powerful persistent mechanisms to account for lasting e¤ects of money on
output and with powerful international transmission mechanisms to explain
the positive and signi…cant comovement of output.
The OR model adds another transmission mechanism: the link between
real interest rates and, through the consumers intertemporal behaviour, be-
tween consumption in both countries. The fall of home real interest rate
brings about the fall of the foreign one, and the consequence is that both
aggregate consumptions increase. However, this intertemporal e¤ect is shad-
owed by the expenditure switching e¤ect, resulting in the same negative cor-
relation between home and foreign outputs, as in the MF model. Moreover,
as foreign consumption increases there is a negative comovement of con-
sumption and output, which is clearly at odds with the strongly procyclical
behaviour of consumption found in business cycle research. Recent empiri-
cal research using vector autorregresive (VAR) models has found a di¤erent
story: both home and foreign output increase. Betts and Devereux (2000)
and Kim (1999) …nd a positive response of foreign outputs to US expansion-
ary monetary shocks.2 The latter is a detailed empirical contribution that
concludes that the trade balance is not the main international transmission
1There is a useful web page about this research program where contributions are listed
and, in most cases, available to download: www.princeton.edu/~bmdoyle/open.html.
2There are other VAR models estimated to address the e¤ects of monetary shocks, but
they are generally concerned only with the movement of the real exchange rate and the
current account. The general conclusion is that the real exchange rate depreciates and the
current account improves, as suggested in the MF and OR models. Recent contributions
include Lane (2000), Prasad (1999) and Rogers (1999).
3channel (as in Canova and Dellas, 1993) because the magnitude of the trade
changes is small compared to output changes and because the direction of
change of the trade balance and the output is not always the predicted one.
Kim also …nds evidence that a US monetary expansion decreases real interest
rates both at home and abroad and that this causes an increase in consump-
tion and investment at home and abroad, thus rising aggregate demand and
output, in both countries. Hence, the intertemporal channel seems to be the
one which prevails.
In this paper I argue that if both countries follow a monetary rule tar-
geting the consumer price index (which includes import prices and thus the
e¤ect of nominal exchange rates) then, when the home country lowers its
nominal interest rate, the other will do the same to prevent an increase in
the consumer price index (CPI). This response implies a positive correlation
of nominal interest rates that automatically stabilizes the nominal exchange
rate, thus reducing the expenditure switching e¤ect and predicting, for rea-
sonable parameter values, a positive comovement of home and foreign out-
puts. The second claim of the paper is that the inertia of the interest rule is
necessary to generate persistent real e¤ects of monetary shocks, as measured
by the autocorrelation of home output. Without this inertia in the interest
rule there is no real persistence even with staggered prices a la Calvo. The
reason is that the one-shot, transitory variation of the interest rate brings
about a one-shot, transitory variation of the exchange rate, thus disturbing
the CPI in just one period. If the share of imports on the consumption basket
is important, then staggered home prices are not enough to display inertia
in the CPI: inertia in the nominal exchange rate is also needed, and this is
achieved by the inertia in the interest rule.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the
model, section 3 explains the monetary policy rule, and in section 4 a nominal
persistence mechanism is incorporated to the model via staggered prices a
la Calvo and inertia in the interest rule. Section 5 provides the concluding
comments.
2 The model
The simplest general equilibrium model in which we can explore the implica-
tions of monetary policy rules is the OR redux model, with the modi…cation
developed by Tille (2000) to distinguish between cross-country and within-
country elasticities of substitution.
42.1 Setup
There is a continuum of individuals, z 2 [0;1], distributed in two countries:
home, with z 2 [0;n], and foreign with z 2 (n;1]. Each individual is a



























where 0 < ¯ < 1;Â > 0: The de…nition of the consumption index C allows


















where Ch;Cf are the subindexes of the consumption of home produced goods
and foreign produced goodsrespectively, and ¸ isthe elasticity of substitution
between them (the cross-country elasticity) that we will assume greater than
































where µ is the elasticity of substitution between goods of the same country










































































5where P(z) is the domestic price of a home produced good z; P ¤(z) is the
foreign price of a home produced good z, Pf(z) is the domestic price of a
foreign produced good z and P¤f(z) is the foreign price of a foreign produced
good z.
We allow the law of one price to hold so that, if S denotes the nominal
exchange rate then, for any product z, P(z) = SP¤(z) and P f(z) = SP¤f(z):
This implies, by the de…nition of the price indexes, that P h = SP ¤h and
Pf = SP¤f and the PPP holds:
P = SP
¤
The individual demands of home and foreign consumers are functions











































¤ ; z 2 (n;1]
where we have already included the assumption of within country symmetry
of consumers, so that C(z) = C and C¤(z) = C¤. Then C;C¤ are the
aggregate per capita consumptions of each country.
With the above individual demands we can compute the global demand





















w; z 2 (n;1]
where Cw is the world per capita consumption, de…ned as:
C
w ´ nC + (1 ¡ n)C
¤
62.2 Linearized equations
As the model is well-known I will proceed with the linearized equations (see
appendix A for the details). All non-capital variables are log-deviations from
theirsteady state values (except forthe interest rateswhich are the deviations
from their steady state values).
bt = (1 + R)bt¡1 + p
h























t = ¡¸qt (6)
(1 + ¸)p
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t = Et[ct+1 ¡c
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t+1] (9)
mt ¡ pt = ct ¡
1
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The …rst two equations are the expressions for the current account, in-
cluding in the second one that nbt +(1¡n)b¤
t = 0, where b is the net foreign
asset position. Together they imply the global resource constraint cw = yw,
where cw
t = nct +(1¡n)ct and yw
t = n(ph





Equation (5) de…nes the terms of trade. Note that in this model the PPP
prevails, so that the real exchange rate is constant, but the terms of trade
is not. Equation (6) comes from substracting the global demands faced by
producers of both countries. The parameter ¸ turns out to be the critical one
in this model, as it controls the magnitude of the expenditure switching e¤ect
after a change in the terms of trade. Equations (7) and (8) are the optimal
prices for the monopolists. They say that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the
CPI will be matched with an equal increase in the monopolist price, that
an increase in world consumption (a shift in demand) will increase the price
and an increase in home consumption will increase the marginal disutility of
7supplying an additional unit, and thus the monopolist will increase the price.
Equation (9) follows from substracting the consumption Euler equations in
each country, taking into account that the real interest rate will be the same
in each country due to the uncovered interest parity (UIP) and the PPP,
as explained in the appendix A and below. Equations (10) and (11) are
the money market equilibrium conditions. Finally, (12) and (13) are the
loglinearized versions of the CPIs.
The 11 equations (3)-(13) determine the 11 variables: y; y¤; c; c¤; p; p¤;
ph; p¤f; q; s; b given the stochastic processes for m; m¤ in (14)-(15). The
shocks to the monetary aggregates are permanent:
With this model the neutrality of money holds in the long and short run.
Only prices (including the exchange rate) will increase if the money stock
increases.
2.3 One period rigid prices
As a …rst step towards a dynamic model with price stickiness we construct a
one period …x price version. Henceforth we have to distinguish between the
optimal prices given in (7)-(8), which we will refer to as ph; p¤f :
p
h























and the actual prices set by …rms: ph; p¤f. These optimal prices do not hold
in the short run, but they do in the long run.
To capture that prices are set one period in advance and adjusted every











The solution of the model is explained in appendix A. The exchange rate
is determined combining the conditions for money market equilibriumin both
countries:
st = (mt ¡ m
¤
t) ¡ (ct ¡ c
¤
t) (17)
The terms of trade follows from the pricing equations and the above equation
for the exchange rate:








8The termsof tradewill revert tothe initial steady state value aftera monetary
shock unless there is a permanent di¤erence in percapita consumptions. This
di¤erence is in turn:
ct ¡ c
¤
t = ¼cbbt¡1 + ¼cc(ct¡1 ¡ c
¤
t¡1) + ¼c""t (19)
¼cb > 0;¼cc > 0;¼c" > 0
The impact of the monetary shock is determined by the parameter ¼c" which




R(1 + ¸)¸ + 2¸
This parameter turns out to be very small: for our baseline parameter values3
(¸ = 1:5; n = 0:5; R = 0:01) is only 0.004, meaning that a 1% increase
in money supply creates a gap of a 0.004% (of the steady state per capita
consumption) between both countries. This gap is related to the wealth e¤ect
of the current account surplus that will provide a net foreign asset position






where the letter without time subscript stands for long run deviations. How-
ever, this e¤ect is very small: in our case
¼cb
1¡¼cc = 0:016:
From the pricing rules we can compute the world CPI:
p
w














t+1 = 0 (21)
so that the expected value of global per capita consumption for the period
after the shock is the steady state value, because all prices will adjust to the




t = ¡¯rt (22)
3Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1998) report that the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods tends to be between 1 and 2, and they choose a value of 1.5
following Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994).
9Roughly speaking, a decrease of one point in real interest rate will increase
global per capita consumption 1%.
We show in the appendix that aggregating the money market equilibrium










which shows that the nominal shock will increase global consumption but
only in the period when the innovation takes place. National per capita
consumptions can be obtained as follows:
ct = c
w







t ¡ n(ct ¡c
¤
t)
From these expressions it can be concluded that if the wealth e¤ect is small,
as we have seen is the case, both consumptions will increase practically the
same amount, thus producing the high (almost perfect) correlation between
home and foreign consumption.
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¤
and the national outputs can be computed as:
yt = y
w
t + (1 ¡ n)(yt ¡ y
¤
t) = n"t ¡ (1 ¡n)¸qt (24)





t ¡ n(yt ¡ y
¤
t) = n"t + n¸qt
' n"t ¡ n¸"t = n(1 ¡ ¸)"t
where the approximation comes from (ct ¡ c¤
t) ' 0. While home output will
always increase after a monetary expansion, the e¤ect on foreign output will
be negative if ¸ > 1. This implies a negative correlation of (y; y¤) and also
a negative correlation of (y¤; c¤). However, both correlations are positive in
the business cycle facts and in the VAR evidence.
The results are the same for the short and long run as in OR and in Tille
(2000). An increase in m generates an increase of y, but also a decrease
in y¤. Figure 1 has the results of a simulation with the baseline parameter
values n = 0:5 and ¸ = 1:5. The increase in m is 1%. The nominal exchange
rate jumps immediately to its new steady state value. The home and foreign
producer prices are …xed in the …rst period, but the CPI will increase due
to the exchange rate depreciation. The terms of trade worsens due to the
10depreciation, but that generates a demand switching e¤ect in favour of home
goods, so that home production increases and the foreign one decreases. The
consumption increases because of the fall in the real interest rate (and this
increase is the same in both countries because they face the same interest
rate). As the rise in the income of home (ph + y ¡ p) is bigger than in con-
sumption, due to consumption smoothing, the current account experiences
a superavit. In period 2 the producers’ prices adjust fully to the new con-
ditions, thus reaching the new steady state values. This makes the terms of
trade to return to its initial level. The CPIs adjust as well, turning the real
interest rate back to the initial value, eliminating the increase in consump-
tion and returning the outputs to normal. The only permanent e¤ect is the
one in the net foreign assets, that will increase for the home country, and the
interest payments on this positive b will allow this country to consume for
ever a little more than initially (the opposite is true for the foreign country).
Tille (2000) shows that the cross-country elasticity controls the sign of
the e¤ect of a shock on the welfare of both countries. When this elasticity
is small (less than the within country, ¸ < µ; which is the most probable
case) a worsening in the terms of trade will result in a negative welfare
e¤ect, thus a monetary expansion would be “beggar thyself” and “prosper
thy neighbour”. The OR case is one in which both cross-country and within-
country elasticities are the same (¸ = µ), and this implies that the e¤ects on
welfare are positive and of the same magnitude in both countries.
A special case is considered by Corsetti and Pesenti (1999). They show
that if the cross-country elasticity is equal to one (¸ = 1), then there are
no current account imbalances between the two countries, as the decline in
the terms of trade following a monetary shock is o¤set by a rise in relative
nominal income. In this special case there is no wealth reallocation e¤ect
and therefore no long run real e¤ect. The worsening of the terms of trade
has a negative impact on the welfare of the country that could prove to be
bigger than the positive e¤ect of the increase in consumption, bringing about
a “beggar thyself” result. The output transmission of the monetary shock
could be positive or negative, depending on the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. However, the welfare of the foreign country always increases
due to the rise in consumption, thus resulting in a “prosper thy neighbour”
e¤ect.
The focus of our attention here is that the correlation of outputs is nega-
tive, contrary to the general evidence provided by the international business
cycle literature and, more signi…cantly, contrary to the evidence presented in
Betts and Devereux (2000) and Kim (1999) from VAR models constructed
to analyze the transmission of monetary shocks from one country to another.
As discussed in the introduction, they …nd a positive transmission in outputs.
11We wish to make the point that if the monetary authorities in both coun-
tries follow an interest rule with a price level target, then they will automat-
ically damp ‡uctuations in the nominal exchange rate, and that will reduce
the expenditure switching e¤ect, allowing the foreign country to increase also
its output in response to a home nominal shock (which in that case will be
a negative innovation in home nominal interest rate). This is what we will
show in the next section.
3 Monetary policy rules
Monetary policy rules have received a great deal of attention since the pro-
posal of Taylor (1993). The recent volume edited by Taylor (1999) contains
much of the state of the art on the issue4. Interestingly, in that volume only
the paper by Ball (1999) considers an open economy, and it is not an opti-
mizing model. Optimizing models of in‡ation targeting in an open economy
are Svensson (2000a) and McCallum and Nelson (1999), both of them deal
with the case of a small economy. McCallum and Nelson build their model
on the redux model adding staggered prices, but they do not address the
main issue we are concerned with here: the sign of the output transmission
of monetary shocks.
3.1 The interest rate rule
When the monetary authority …xes the nominal interest rate directly, the
monetary aggregate becomes an endogenous variable which can be deter-
mined by the demand for money equation. As we are not concerned with the
value of the monetary aggregate, we simply substitute in the previous model
the money market equilibrium condition by the following policy rule for the
nominal interest rate (It):
It = d0 + d1(logPt ¡ logP
T)
where PT is the target consumer price index. This rule is analyzed in a
closed economy by King and Wolman (1999) and Svensson (2000b) discusses
the advantages of price-level targeting compared to in‡ation-targeting. The
price level target is going to be the steady state value (P = P T). Then, as
logPt ¡ logP = pt, it implies that d0 = R = (1 ¡ ¯)=¯; and the rule can be
4John B. Taylor mantains a very useful web page on monetary policy rules at
www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/PolRulLink.htm
12…nally written as:
it = It ¡R = d1pt + ut (25)
ut = ½ut¡1 + "t (26)
where u is the monetary shock, assumed to be an AR(1) process with per-
sistence ½ and "t is the white noise innovation. With an interest rate rule,
monetary shocks are exogenous stochastic shifts in the feedback rule used
by the monetary authority, as de…ned by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998,
p.4). McCallum and Nelson (1999) also study the impulse responses after a
shock to the interest rate rule, interpreted as unexpected variations in the
interest rate. King and Wolman (1999) assume ½ = 0:5: In a simple model
like this one we can think of the shock u as a short-cut of a demand shock
(government spending, investment, private consumption driven by a stock
exchange increases, etc).















A temporary increase in the domestic nominal interest rate will result in
a depreciation for the foreign country that will increase its CPI and will be
met with an increase in the foreign nominal interest rate. Hence, the policy
rules will enforce a positive correlation of both interest rates. As long as the
prices are not responding fully in the short run, the nominal appreciation
for the home country will result in an increase of its terms of trade, and
that triggers the switching e¤ect of domestic goods for foreign goods, the
mechanism that produces the negative correlation of both outputs. But this
mechanism will be reduced in a magnitude proportional to the parameter d1.
To complete the model we need to link the nominal interest rate to the
real variables. The …rst link is the Fisher equation relating nominal and real
interest rates:




or in the linearized form5:
¯it = ¯rt + Etpt+1 ¡ pt (29)
5Notice that we could have exploited the usual simpli…cation 1=(1+R) ¼ 1; but in our
case 1=(1 + R) = ¯:
13The second link is the uncovered interest parity (UIP):






in its linearized form:
¯it = ¯i
¤
t + Etst+1 ¡ st (30)
Together with the PPP (p = s + p¤) both links imply the real interest rate
parity: r = r¤. Finally we can use the consumption Euler equation to include
the e¤ects of nominal interest rates in the model:
¯rt = ¯it ¡Etpt+1 + pt = Etct+1 ¡ct
3.2 Solution of the model
The policy rules (25) and (27) imply the following equation:
it ¡i
¤
t = d1st + ut ¡ u
¤
t
Plugging this into the UIP yields a rational expectations equation for the
nominal exchange rate:
¯(d1st + ut ¡ u
¤
t) = Etst+1 ¡st
Taking into account the process for ut and making u¤
t = 0;8t, the solution
is:
st = ¼suut (31)
¼su = ¡
¯
1 + ¯d1 ¡ ½
< 0
This equation controls the response and the dynamics of the nominal ex-
change rate, and given that ph and p¤f are …xed in the …rst period, this
equation gives also the immediate response of the terms of trade. It is clear
from equation (31) that the response of the exchange rate is smaller the big-
ger d1 is (i.e. the stronger is the commitment of the monetary authority to
the target), and that the volatility of the exchange rate increases with the
persistence of the shock. In addition, we can show that st+1 = ½st; so that
the persistence of the shock is directly translated into the nominal exchange
rate.
The terms of trade is:






14where the …rst term is the impact, depending on the innovation, and the
second term is the long run e¤ect, depending on the per capita consumption
di¤erence generated by the wealth transfer due to a current account imbal-
ance. This will be bigger the more persistent the monetary shock is, as this
will increase the response of the terms of trade. Below is shown that the last
term is close to zero, so the important movement is determined by the period
innovation.
The per capita consumption di¤erence is:
ct ¡ c
¤
t = ¼cbbt¡1 + ¼cc(ct¡1 ¡ c
¤
t¡1) + ¼c""t (33)
¼cb > 0; ¼cc < 0; ¼c" < 0
In our baseline parameterization (with ½ = 0:5) the di¤erence in per capita
consumption will increase in a 0.002% after a shock of one point in the
domestic nominal interest rate.
The pricing rules are the same as in the previous section, therefore we




t = (1 + ¯d1)¼sun"t (34)
So that a decrease in one point of the home nominal interest rate will increase
world per capita consumption in 0.6%. The persistence of this innovation
does not add inertia to the consumption, but increases the impact. For
national consumptions we …nd the same result as in (23): a high positive
correlation since (ct ¡ c¤
t) is very small.
For national outputs we …nd now:
yt = y
w
t + (1 ¡ n)(yt ¡ y
¤
t) = (1 + ¯d1)¼sun"t ¡ (1 ¡n)¸qt (35)





t ¡ n(yt ¡ y
¤
t) = (1 + ¯d1)n"t + n¸qt
' (1 + ¯d1)¼sun"t ¡ n¸¼su"t = (1 + ¯d1 ¡¸)n¼su"t
With a decrease in the domestic rate (" < 0), home output increases, but
foreign output increases only if:
1 + ¯d1 ¡ ¸ > 0
To ful…ll this condition d1 must be greater than (¸¡1)=¯: With our baseline
value of ¸ = 1:5 this condition is accomplished by d1 = 1:5, the value used
in the Taylor rule. It is straightforward to see that the correlation between
y; y¤ will increase with the value of d1 and decrease with ¸:
15Figure 2 presents the results of a simulation with ¸ = 1:5; ½ = 0:5 and
d1 = 1:5. The decrease in the terms of trade is much smaller now. This
smaller decrease in the real price of home goods allows a positive output
transmission, since the e¤ect of the increase in demand will be stronger than
the expenditure switching e¤ect.
4 Adding persistence
The persistence over time of the real e¤ects of a nominal shock is a key
question. The empirical evidence (as surveyed by Walsh, 1998) is that a
monetary shock brings about a hump shaped impulse response function on
output, with a peak in about 6-8 quarters. A strong persistence (or prop-
agation) mechanism is necessary because, with rational expectations, only
the unforeseen part of the monetary rule has real e¤ects, so autocorrelation
of the monetary process is not a solution, as it is in the case of productivity
shocks.
A real persistence mechanism is already present: the reallocation of
wealth between countries following a current account (CA) imbalance. An-
dersen and Beier (2000) analyze a model with this CA propagation mecha-
nism as the only source of persistence, and show that the dynamic response
of the terms of trade to a nominal shock does not match the empirical ev-
idence. They stress the importance of staggered price setting as a nominal
propagation mechanism that changes the dynamic response of the economy
to nominal shocks, making it more similar to the form observed empirically.
However, they conclude that persistence obtained with staggered prices is
still not enough, and must be reinforced with another persistence mecha-
nism, as capital accumulation. Indeed, Andersen (1999) shows that in a
closed economy model both mechanisms, staggering and capital accumula-
tion, reinforce each other and generate a signi…cant amount of persistence in
the endogenous variables.
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1998) …nd that staggering is crucial to
generate a volatile and persistent response of the exchange rate to monetary
shocks, but they conclude that to match the observed persistence in real and
nominal exchange rates an unrealistic 12 quarters stickiness is needed. An-
other important problem is that they can only match the observed positive
comovements in consumption and output if the monetary processes in both
countries are correlated. If they are independent, the transmission mecha-
nism through trade is weak and generates positive but small comovements.
Their model has complete markets and pricing to market features, and it is
not clear if these features are conditioning the result.
16Kollmann (1999) adds staggering following the Calvo (1983) structure in
both prices and nominal wages, along with capital accumulation in acomplete
businesscycle model. Hisresult is that nominal shocks have longerreal e¤ects
with staggering in both prices and wages than in only one of them. He also
…nds that after a domestic nominal shock the output of the other country
does not decrease but increases due to the fact that quantitatively the income
e¤ect and the liquidity e¤ect on the other country are more important.
Betts and Devereux (2000) develop a model with staggering a la Calvo
(1983) and capital accumulation in which the PTM feature and the com-
pleteness of the asset markets can vary, and they relate these features to the
international transmission of policy. The e¤ects of monetary policy on the
foreign country depends crucially on the degree of PTM up to a point in
which the e¤ects are reversed. When there is no PTM the results are those
in the OR setup: the depreciation makes the terms of trade fall, triggering
an expenditure switching e¤ect from foreign goods to home goods, and the
transmission is negative. This result clearly contradicts Kollmann, and more
research is needed. In the PTM case a depreciation has the opposite e¤ect
on the terms of trade: as the export prices are set in the foreign currency
and the import prices in home currency, when the exchange rate depreciates
the real price of home goods in terms of foreign goods (the terms of trade)
increases. However, with PTM there is no expenditure switching e¤ect as
there is no immediate pass-through from the exchange rate to prices and thus
in both countries output increases. The problem is that the model predicts
a positive correlation between the terms of trade and output and a positive
correlation between nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade (Obstfeld
and Rogo¤, 2000).
4.1 Staggered prices a la Calvo.
To include nominal persistence we use the Calvo (1983) structure. We de…ne
the …x probability of changing the price in one period as °. Then, denoting
by pha
t the price set by a home …rm in t; this will be (see Appendix):
p
ha
t = [1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)¯]p
h
t + (1 ¡ °)¯Etp
ha
t+1





t + (1 ¡ °)p
h
t¡1 (36)





t + (1 ¡ °)p
¤f
t¡1 (37)
17Figure 3 contains the results of a simulation with the same parameters
as before, except that ½ = 0 from now on, and ° = 0:2, so that the expected
time between price adjustments is 5 periods. The long run and the impact
e¤ects are as explained in section 3. The di¤erence is the adjustment process,
that it is not as smooth as we expected. The reason is that we have in fact a
smooth adjustment in ph, as stated in (36), but this is only a proportion of
the CPI variability, dominated by the movement of the exchange rate. The
exchange rate has no persistence because the shock to the interest rule is now
a one shot without persistence. In equation (12) for the domestic CPI we can
see that, in order to have a sluggish CPI adjustment, a smooth adjustment
is needed of the home price, the foreign price and the exchange rate. The
last requirement is achieved either with a persistent shock (½ > 0) or with
inertia in the monetary policy, which we now introduce.
4.2 Interest rules with inertia
In this section we turn to the case in which there is inertia in the monetary
policy (for reasons analyzed in Woodford 1999). Then we have:




t is de…ned in the previous rule: iT
t = d1pt: Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2000) and McCallum and Nelson (1999) estimate a value of ® near 0.8.
Figure 4 depicts the e¤ects. Now all the variables, nominal and real,
adjust smoothly. Contrary to the case in Figure 3 where ® = 0; now the
CPI adjusts slowly, because the exchange rate also does, due in turn to the
slow movement of nominal interest rate. Recall that the shock is transitory,
not permanent, so that the forward looking behavior of the exchange rate
is re‡ected in the immediate jump, but afterwards it has to return to the
initial steady state value and that is controlled by the nominal interest rate
di¤erentials through the UIP. The CPI sluggishness makes the real interest
rate to move also slowly, then consumption and then output. The impact ef-
fects are bigger, compared to Figure 3. Consumption increases more because
the real interest rate is under the long run value for longer. The nominal
exchange rate jumps further because of the expected longer time of the gap
between home and foreign nominal interest rates and the damping e¤ect of
the interest rule is reduced to a …fth with (1 ¡ ®) = 0:2 in equation (38).
The total increase in global demand will be split between the two countries
following equation (6), and as the increase in the nominal exchange rate on
impact is bigger, the consequence is that the di¤erence (y¡y¤) increases and
the correlation (y; y¤) decreases.
18Table 1 presents some results on the sensibility to ®. This behaviour of
the monetary authority adds inertia to the real variables: the autocorrelation
of the output is a signi…cant 0.42 with ® = 0:8:
The last row of the table shows the relative volatility of the terms of trade
compared with the volatility of output. This small values could be viewed as
a weakness of this model, since one of the stylized business cycle facts is that
the value is around 4 (see for instance Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 1998).
However, in a more detailed business cycle model (similar to Kollmann, 1999)
we should specify more carefully the proportion of foreign goods that a coun-
try consumes, that is, the degree of openness. Here that degree is simply the
relative size of the country, which we have assumed 0.5. The result obtained
here could be interpreted as making the volatility of the exchange rate the
direct reason for the volatility of output, and so to conclude that there is a
case for the desirability of a …xed exchange rate or a monetary union. If we
wished to apply this model to the US-EU relations, for instance, we should
take into account the limited proportion of the international trade between
both countries, probably no more than a 10% of the consumption basket.
This would highly restrict the e¤ect of the movements of the terms of trade
on the output, increasing the relative volatility of the terms of trade and
reinforcing our main point, that the transmission of the monetary shocks is
more related to the decrease of the real interest rates in both countries than
to the trade.
There is a number of ways to reduce the openness. One possibility is to
include nontraded goods in the model, as in Hau (2000) and Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ (2000). This extension is relevant because in addition to reduce the
expenditure switching e¤ect, it breaks the PPP, an uncomfortable feature of
the model (see Rogo¤, 1996, for a discussion on the PPP). If the PPP does
not hold, neither will hold the real interest parity, and this will allow the
national consumptions to be less correlated.
A second way is to introduce a home bias in preference as in Warnock
(1999), so that for any relative price, Home consumers buy a bigger propor-
tion of home goods than Foreign consumers. This is shown to reduce also
the switching e¤ect of the terms of trade.
5 Conclusions
The main conclusion is that according to our model monetary policy rules
targeting the consumer price index would tend to produce a positive out-
put transmission of monetary shocks. The reason is that the rule tends to
stabilize the nominal exchange rate, reducing the volatility of the terms of
19trade and …nally damping the expenditure switching e¤ect. The direct pos-
itive e¤ect on global demand after a decrease in real interest rates prevails,
providing the interest rule is stronger enough: the parameter controlling the
response to a change in the CPI has to be su¢ciently high. Our simulations
suggest that the value of the famous Taylor rule, 1.5, is enough to achieve
the positive correlation of national and foreign outputs.
The second claim is that the inertia of the nominal interest rates turns
out to be a necessary condition to produce inertia in the real variables after
a shock to the interest rule. Without it, even with staggered prices there is
no real persistence in the model after a one time shock to the interest rate
rule, because the CPI will return quickly to its steady state value, as well as
the exchange rate. But if there is inertia in the interest rate the exchange
rate will jump further and then adjust smoothly, and so will do the CPI and
then the real interest rate, consumption and output.
A Solution of the model
This appendix explains brie‡y the model of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), with
the quali…cation of Tille (2000), which is the workhorse of this paper.
The individual home resident period budget constraint is:
PtBt + Mt = Pt(1 + Rt¡1)Bt¡1 + Mt¡1 + Pt(z)Yt(z) ¡PtCt ¡ PtTt (39)
where Bt¡1 is the (end of period) holdings of the unique real bond traded
between both countries, Rt¡1is the real interest rate, Mt¡1is the stock of
domestic money, Yt(z) is the individual production and Tt is the net tax.




The nominal interest rate It is de…ned in the Fisher relationship:




where Et is the expectation operator. The uncover interest parity (UIP):










20The behaviour of the representative agent is obtained by maximizing the
utility function U in (1) subject to the global demand for his product in (2)
and the budget constraint in (39). The …rst order conditions (FOCs) faced
by the home representative agent are (similar conditions hold for the foreign
agent):































The equilibrium conditions are:
nBt + (1 ¡n)B
¤





t = 0 (44)
where Y w














We consider a symmetric steady state where B = B
¤ = 0. In the steady
state:



























Next we explain the loglinearized equations in (3)-(13). Here x denotes
the log-deviation fromsteady state of X, except forr;i which are rt = Rt¡Rt,
and it = It ¡ It. The equilibrium conditions (43) and (44) are equivalent to
the equations (3),(4) in the text where bt is de…ned as (Bt ¡ B)=Y since
B = 0.
The expressions for the terms of trade q in (5) and for the price indexes
in (12) and (13) are straightforward.
21Equation (6) is obtained by substracting the linearized versions of the
demand equations (2):











t ] + c
w
t
and using the de…nition of q.
Equations (7) and (8) are the linearized versions of the optimal prices in
(42).
The linearized consumption Euler equations are:






and substracting them yields equation (9). Equations (10) and (11) are the
linearized versions of (41).
A.1 One period rigid prices
To solve the model we follow the procedure used by Andersen and Beier
(2000).

























The solution of this expression is equation (17) in the text.
Substracting the current account equations (3) and (4) yields:
bt = (1 + R)bt¡1 + (1 ¡ n)[(yt ¡ y
¤




t ¡ st ¡ p
¤f
t )]
Using (5) and (6) we can rewrite it as:
bt = (1 + R)bt¡1 + (1 ¡ n)(1 ¡ ¸)qt ¡ (1 ¡ n)(ct ¡ c
¤
t) (45)
eliminating q with (18) yields:
bt = (1 + R)bt¡1 ¡ (1 ¡n)¸(ct ¡ c
¤






¡(1 ¡ n)(1 ¡ ¸)"t
22Now we are ready to solve for (ct ¡ c¤




t+1) = ¼cb[(1 + R)bt¡1 ¡ (1 ¡n)¸(ct ¡ c
¤






¡(1 ¡ n)(1 ¡¸)"t] + ¼cc(ct ¡ c
¤
t)
Using the Euler equation (9) and equating coe¢cients:
¼cb =
R(1 + ¸)(1 + R)






R(1 + ¸)¸ + 2¸




R(1 + ¸)¸ + 2¸
> 0 for ¸ > 1
Note that ¼c" computes the impact e¤ect of the nominal shock, and this is
exactly equal to the value computed in OR.
To compute the world per capita consumption we …rst have to compute
the world CPI. This is, using the pricing rules in (16):
p
w
t = npt + (1 ¡ n)p
¤






















































which implies that Etcw
t+1 = 0: Substituiting back we …nd: pw
t = Et¡1pw
t :
This expectations are formed observing the behaviour of the world money
markets, to which we now turn.






















Using the previous result that Etcw
























From this, we compute that Et¡1pw
t = mw
















B Solution with interest rate rules
The CA equations imply (45) and using the expression for q in (32) yields:
bt = (1 + R)bt¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ n)(ct ¡ c
¤






¡(1 ¡ n)(1 ¡¸)¼su"t
Now, with the guess in (33) we can compute:
Et(ct+1 ¡c
¤
t+1) = ¼cb[(1 + R)bt¡1 ¡ (1 ¡n)(ct ¡ c
¤






¡(1 ¡ n)(1 ¡¸)¼su"t] + ¼cc(ct ¡ c
¤
t)
Making use of the Euler equation (9) and equating coe¢cients:
¼cb =
R(1 + ¸)(1 + R)






R(1 + ¸) + 2¸




R(1 + ¸) + 2¸
¼su < 0 for ¸ > 1































































t = (1 + ¯d1)¼su"
w
t = (1 + ¯d1)¼sun"t
C Staggering a la Calvo
Let ° be the constant probability of adjusting the price at any period. The
agent will choose a price pha








































The FOC for this problem is:
p
ha








which can be written as:
p
ha
t = [1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)¯]p
h
t + (1 ¡ °)¯Etp
ha
t+1
With a large number of agents, ° is also the fraction of them adjust-
ing their prices each period, hence the aggregate home price level evolves
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28Table 1. Sensitivity to ®
® 0 0.5 0.8 0.95
correlation (y; y¤) 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.23
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
autocorrelation (y) -0.13 0.20 0.42 0.54
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
correlation (y; q) -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.62
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
sd q/sd y 0.72 0.70 0.73 0.83
Note: Results are the average of 100 simulations of a 100 periods each.
In brackets the standard errors of the coe¢cients.
Parameter values: ½ = 0; ¸ = 1:5; ° = 0:2; d1 = 1:5:
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Figure 1: Impulse responses after a permanent monetary shock to the do-
mestic stock of money. ¸ = 1:5:









q and s 

























































Figure 2: Impulse responses after a persistent shock to the domestic interest
rate rule. d1 = 1:5; ¸ = 1:5; ½ = 0:5:
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Figure 3: Impulse responses after a one-time shock to the domestic interest
rate rule in the model with staggered prices á la Calvo. d1 = 1:5; ¸ = 1:5;
° = 0:2:
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Figure 4: Impulse responses after a one-time shock to the domestic interest
rate rule in the model with staggered prices á la Calvo and inertia. d1 = 1:5,
¸ = 1:5; ° = 0:2; ® = 0:8:
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